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  ABSTRACT 
 
In the light of worldwide commitments to meet global basic learning needs made at 
the 1990 United Nations Conference on Education for All (EFA) in Jomtien, the 2000 World 
Education  Forum  in  Dakar  and  the  2000  United  Nations  Millennium  Summit  in  New  York, 
UNESCO has established a Working Group on Debt Swaps for Education which has met on two 
occasions so far, in 2006 and 2007. Drawing on experiences of bilateral donors such as Spain 
and  Germany,  this  UNESCO  Working  Group  is  now  promoting  debt-for-education  swaps, 
constructions  whereby external  debt  is cancelled by the creditor in exchange  for the debtor 
government’s commitment to mobilise domestic resources for education sector spending. The 
experience  with  debt  swaps  in  the  mid  1990s  was,  however,  far  from  positive,  and  recent 
improved insight in the economics of debt relief suggests extreme caution. In reviewing debt-for-
education swaps between Germany and Indonesia and between Spain and El Salvador, this 
paper examines to what extent these second-generation debt swaps differ from their contested 
predecessors.  We  argue  that,  while  the  Paris  Declaration’s  principles  of  policy  and  system 
alignment appear to have been fairly well implemented on education sector level in both case 
studies  considered,  it  is  mainly  the  macro-economic  nature  of  such  swaps  that  remains 
problematic. For debt relief to hold at least some promise of translating into an efficient and 
effective instrument of development, it should be large and comprehensive, as in the case of the 
HIPC Initiative and its successor the MDRI. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 1990, delegates from 155 countries committed themselves to meet basic 
learning needs on a global level at the United Nations World Conference on Education for All 
(EFA) in Jomtien, Thailand, thereby recognizing education as a key aspect of poverty reduction 
and development (UNESCO, 1990). The original EFA Declaration was reaffirmed but slightly 
amended in April 2000 when the Dakar Framework for Action adopted by the World Education 
Forum stated that the focus should not solely be on the overall expansion of enrolment but also 
on  ensuring  education  of  good  quality.  This  framework  acknowledged  furthermore  that  no 
country seriously committed to EFA should be thwarted in its striving towards this objective by a 
lack of resources (UNESCO, 2000). The millennium year also marked the beginning of a more 
comprehensive approach to end extreme poverty, as agreed at the United Nations Millennium 
Summit  and  outlined  in  eight  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  with  2015  set  as  the 
target date for achievement. Education was given a central role, enshrined in the second MDG 
of ensuring universal primary schooling for all boys and girls and in the third MDG that calls for 
elimination of gender disparities at all levels of education (UN DESA, 2007). 
 
After a series of international initiatives and declarations, such as the EFA Fast 
Track Initiative (FTI) launched in June 2002, and recalling the promises made in Dakar, the 
General  Conference  of  UNESCO  passed  at  its  33rd  session  in  October  2005  a  resolution 
leading  in  2006  to  the  establishment  of  a  Working  Group  on  Debt  Swaps  for  Education, 
entrusted  with  the  mission  to  assess  the  potential  of  such  swaps  to  address  the  existing 
financing gap for EFA and their educational implications (UNESCO, 2006). The Working Group 
assembled for the first time in Paris on 27-28 November 2006 (see UNESCO, 2007a). A second 
meeting took place in Buenos Aires on 12-13 July 2007 (see UNESCO, 2007b). During these 
Working  Group  meetings  several  country  experiences  with  debt-for-education  swaps  were 
presented,  including  three  swap  deals  between  Germany  and  Indonesia  and  a  Spanish-El 
Salvadorian one. 
 
In November 2000, the German and Indonesian governments agreed in principle 
on a first debt-for-education swap arrangement. The actual project agreement for this first swap 
was  signed  in  December  2002  and  stipulated  that  Germany  would  cancel  a  bilateral  debt 
volume  of  €  25.6  million,  under  the  condition  that  Indonesia  spend  the  local  currency 
countervalue of half of this renunciated debt amount (spread over three years from 2003 to 
2005) on advanced teacher training, more specifically the construction and equipment of 511 
learning resource centers (Allramseder & Schmalhofer, 2004; Berensmann, 2007). A second 
debt-for-education swap was agreed upon in October 2002 with the definitive agreement signed 
in the beginning of 2004. This swap deal involved € 23 million of bilateral debt. The conversion 
rate was again 50 percent, but this time the Indonesian government committed itself to invest 
the countervalue funds in the construction of 100 new junior secondary schools in the remote 
Eastern provinces in the period 2005-2007 (Allramseder & Schmalhofer, 2004; Berensmann, 
2007). A third swap of € 20 million for the recontruction of Indonesian schools damaged by the 
earthquake that struck the area of  Yogyakarta and  Central Java on 17 May  2006 is still  in 
progress (KfW Office Jakarta, 2008). 
 
The government of El Salvador signed in on a debt-for-education swap with Spain 
in  December  2005.  Two  months  earlier,  the  Spanish-El  Salvadorian  debt  swap  was  set  by 
bilateral agreement at $ 10 million, with a programme duration of 4 years, a conversion rate of  
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100 percent and the countervalue to be deposited in a special account (Romero, 2006; Vera, 
2007). El Salvador agreed to invest the funds in education. In 2006, the relevant Binational and 
Technical Committees approved the project of the construction and renovation of educational 
infrastructure,  accounting  for  70  percent  of  the  available  funds.  The  acquisition  of  didactic 
material in the poorest regions of El Salvador made up the remaining 30 percent (Romero, 
2006; Vera, 2007). 
 
According  to  UNESCO  (2006)  debt-for-education  swaps  are  innovative  financial 
instruments that can significantly contribute to EFA objectives. They belong to a class of debt 
relief interventions known as debt-for-development swaps where external debt is cancelled by 
the  creditor  in  exchange  for  the  debtor  government’s  commitment  to  mobilise  domestic 
resources  (in  local  currency)  for  agreed  development  oriented  purposes.  In  case  those 
resources are explicitly earmarked to education spending, such interventions are denoted as 
debt-for-education swaps. Essentially, the latter consist of a switch of public sector spending 
from debt service to development in the field of education.  
 
At  first  sight,  debt-for-education  swaps  may  seem  to  constitute  win-win 
constructions, simultaneously increasing net financial transfers to poor countries, reducing their 
indebtedness and ensuring that freed-up resources are used to serve development purposes in 
the local education sector. If one digs deeper, however, things are not always what they appear. 
Debt-for-education swaps may considerably fall short of their heralded objectives, as will be 
outlined in this paper. In constructing our arguments, we will draw on analytical evidence from 
past  debt  swaps  and  the  aforementioned  debt-for-education  swaps  between  Germany  and 
Indonesia and between Spain and El Salvador in particular. 
 
The  structure  of  this  paper  should  be  interpreted  as  follows.  A  first  section 
examines the main macro-economic impacts of debt swaps in general. Special attention will be 
given  to  issues  of  additional  ‘fiscal  space’  and  impacts  on  debt  sustainability  and  ‘debt 
overhang’. In a second section the focus will be shifted toward the sector level, looking into the 
concept of ‘donor earmarking’ and assessing whether the Indonesian/El Salvadorian education 
sector  support  resulting  from  the  debt  swaps  considered  is  conformable  to  the  Paris 
Declaration’s principles of ‘policy alignment’ and ‘system alignment’. A closing section will then 
critically evaluate the place of debt(-for-education) swaps within the new aid paradigm.  
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I.   MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DEBT SWAPS
1 
 
  Direct impacts  
 
Debt relief to the public sector of a debtor country, whether implemented through 
swaps  or  other  modalities,  is  said  to  create  additional  room  in  this  country’s  budget.  The 
recipient  government  can  then  draw  on  this  ‘fiscal  space’  (Heller,  2005)  to  put  budgetary 
resources,  otherwise  devoted  to  debt  servicing,  to  better  use  without  compromising  the 
sustainability of its fiscal and macro-economic position. Alternatively, the government may use 
the extra fiscal space to bring down its budgetary deficit (Heller, 2005).  
 
However, several important considerations have to be taken into account. First of 
all, it has been argued that ‘…budgetary gains from debt relief only gradually materialise over 
time,  at  the  pace  of  the  contractual  debt  service  payments  cancelled,  the  exact  timing 
depending  on  the  specific  repayment  terms  and  schedule’  (Cassimon  et  al.,  2008:1189). 
Indeed, in general, budgetary gains extend over many years or even decades to come, whereas 
counterpart payments, on the other hand, may be due much earlier, typically within the first few 
years.  The  nominal  value  of  the  cancelled  debt  does  hence  not  necessarily  give  a 
representative  indication  of  debt  relief’s  budgetary  gain.  The  net  present  value  (NPV)  of  all 
future contractual debt service payments that are forgiven takes these timing differences into 
consideration and is arguably a more correct measure. Concerning highly concessional debt 
claims, such as those accounted for as Official Development Assistance (ODA), the nominal 
value and NPV of cancelled debt will differ greatly, the latter being significantly lower (Cassimon 
et al., 2008). Since the German-Indonesian debt-for-education swaps do concern ODA debt 
claims  with  a  long-term  original  repayment  schedule,  their  budgetary  gains  are  much  more 
modest than portrayed by German donor institutions. The Spanish-El Salvadorian operation is 
even  more  problematic.  In  NPV  terms,  fiscal  space  for  the  El  Salvadorian  government  has 
actually shrunk as no positive discount rate was granted on the countervalue funds to be spent 
on education. 
 
Secondly, one should note that the implicit assumption that debt would have been 
fully  serviced  in  the  absence  of  any  debt  relief  operation  is  overly  optimistic,  especially  for 
countries experiencing debt service problems. If not all debt would be serviced, ‘…the resource 
effect of debt reduction is virtual and refers mainly to an accounting cleanup of historical and 
future arrears accumulation’ (Cassimon & Vaessen, 2007:14). Only the share of debt service 
that would have been actually paid up to the creditor in the absence of debt relief generates real 
fiscal space, so that debt relief operations that seem very generous at first sight may in effect 
only bring about minor budgetary gains (Cassimon et al., 2008). The literature seems to suggest 
that debt relief resulting from first-generation swap initiatives was indeed largely fictitious (e.g. 
Krugman, 1988; Bulow & Rogoff, 1991). This criticism also partly extends to HIPC debt relief 
(Cassimon & Vaessen, 2007). We may wonder to ourselves whether second-generation debt 
swaps, typically targeting countries or debt titles outside current debt relief initiatives, perform 
better.  Surely, it is not because a country does not qualify for the HIPC Initiative that debt 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on an earlier assessment of the macro-economic impacts of debt swap 
practices by some of the authors. The most important arguments are here applied to the debt-for-
education swaps mentioned. For a more lengthy analysis, with specific reference to the Global Fund 
Debt2Health Conversion Scheme, see Cassimon et al. (2008).  
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service problems are nonexistent (Cassimon et al., 2008). With respect to our case studies, this 
last  point  might  seem  of  little  importance,  given  that  Indonesia  and  El  Salvador  have  been 
servicing their foreign debts. Even so, however, the fact that both countries enjoyed a debt 
rescheduling at concessional (Houston) terms in the Paris Club
2, an informal forum to negotiate 
debt restructurings between indebted developing countries and their official bilateral creditors, 
hints at some debt serving problems. Possible default may have been only averted by these 
Paris Club debt treatments.  
 
Thirdly, debt swap operations may lead to a crowding out of other, potentially more 
effective aid interventions. All too often it is assumed that debt swaps take place in addition to 
all other forms of donor support, thereby increasing overall net transfers to recipient countries. 
We argue that  this is seldom the case as the aid accounting rules in place seemingly incite 
donors to treat debt relief operations as a substitute for new aid. The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (OECD ) 
uses ODA as a benchmark against which the generosity of donors is weigthed. Since debt relief 
is accounted for as ODA by DAC, debt-for-education swaps thus boost ODA statistics. It can be 
seen that ‘[i]f the donor is targeting a certain ODA level, as it often does, then it will tend to 
reduce  other  categories  of  ODA  spending  [in  compensation]’  (Cassimon  et  al.,  2008:1191). 
There appears to be no evidence that the new generation of debt swaps increases net transfers 
to recipient countries (Birdsall et al., 2003; Ndikumana, 2004) and no clear indication that they 
will do so in the near future, especially not with the prevailing ODA rules which form ‘a recipe for 
non-additional debt relief’ (Cassimon et al., 2008:1191). The question that suggests itself then is 
whether executing a debt-for-education swap at the expense of, for example, budget support, or 
of  local  educational  projects,  is  a  wise  decision.  For  the  reasons  we  have  already  outlined 
before, it may very well not be. 
 
Bearing all the foregoing in mind, we expect that if debt swaps would gain more 
popularity, they would at best only marginally improve total net transfers to developing countries 
and enlarge their fiscal space, and possibly even lead to a reduction of total net transfers and 
shrinking  fiscal  space  (as  in  the  case  of  El  Salvador).  Advocates  of  debt  swaps  should 
recognise this and consider their swap initiatives in relation to other donor interventions. 
 
  Indirect impacts 
 
However, the previous analysis does not generate the final verdict. For even if debt 
swaps  do  not  appear  to  deliver  on  their  promise  of  generating  additional  fiscal  space  for 
recipient  countries,  they  might  induce  other,  more  indirect,  positive  effects  at  the  macro-
economic level  which  would make them worthwhile  operations after all.  In  what follows,  we 
focus on the theory of debt overhang and discuss whether there  is a role to play for swap 
initiatives. 
 
Excessive debt service obligations may incite undesirable government reactions, 
such as lower spending on development priorities or sub-optimal (fiscal) government behaviour 
                                                 
2 Indonesia received debt rescheduling on Houston terms in 2000 and 2002. El Salvador did so in 1990 
(Paris Club, 2008).  
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hampering private sector investment
3. The debtor government may, moreover, be discouraged 
from engaging in economic reform, as foreign creditors are expected be the first to benefit from 
any form of economic progress. This in turn could hold private investors, domestic as well as 
foreign, further back from productively investing in the indebted economy. On the whole, the 
result will be a depressed economic growth rate. This alleged negative relation betw een debt 
and economic growth is usually referred to as the ‘debt overhang hypothesis’ (Krugman, 1988).  
 
Debt  relief,  independent  of  its  earlier-mentioned  direct  macro-economic  effects, 
could possibly breach this debt overhang and trigger a return to a virtuous circle of growth. 
Education expenditure, just as other areas of spending, may  well benefit from an  improved 
public finance situation fostered by economic recovery. Reducing debt burdens could also hold 
positive implications for international net public transfers (Cassimon et al., 2008). Large debt 
burdens have been shown to distort selectivity of donor interventions as donors tend to provide 
the most indebted countries with new credits to allow them to stay current on their debt service 
payments, rather than using these funds for development purposes in countries with a smaller 
debt  stock  and  often  better  policy  choices.  This  phenomenon  has  been  termed  ‘defensive 
lending’ (Birdsall et al., 2003). It is believed that debt relief that wipes out debt overhang could 
possibly restore donor selectivity as defensive lending would become redundant. In addition, 
since the ‘marginal productivity’ of aid is now higher, donors may well decide to further scale up 
aid to countries that escaped the debt trap, trying to enjoy improved rates of return for their 
investments. 
 
Again, the above reasoning is subject to important qualifications. To start with, the 
existence  of  debt  overhang  has  been  questioned,  in  particular  with  respect  to  low-income 
countries (Chauvin & Kraay, 2005) and extremely low or high levels of debt burden (Cordella et 
al.,  2005).  Critics  claim  that  excessive  external  debt,  rather  than  bringing  down  economic 
growth  itself,  is merely  a  symptom  of more  systemic  problems  leading  to  declining  rates  of 
growth. Following this line of argument, debt reduction can only be part of a more long-term 
solution aimed at in-depth institutional, economic and political reform. Nonetheless, for middle-
income  countries,  such  as  Indonesia  and  El  Salvador  that  possess  viable  private  sectors 
attractive to foreign investors, some empirical evidence supporting the debt overhang thesis has 
been found (Patillo et al., 2004; World Bank, 2007a). 
 
More problematical, however, is the assertion that only when debt relief reaches a 
certain critical mass and is delivered in a harmonised and concerted effort, a country will be 
able to overcome the high debt-low growth trap. Debt swaps are deemed too small, if compared 
to the overall debt burden, to make a real dent for recipient countries. To address the problem 
of debt overhang seriously, a ‘discrete shock’ in the form of a large and comprehensive debt 
relief operation would be needed (Bulow & Rogoff, 1991). It was this insight, slowly sinking in 
during the 1990s, that instigated the transition from the first generation of debt swaps to larger-
scale and more comprehensive debt relief schemes such as the HIPC Initiative for low-income 
countries,  or  the  Brady  deals  for  middle-income  countries  with  large  external  private  debts, 
deals typically involving several hundreds of millions of dollars per country (Arslanalp & Henry, 
2005; World Bank-IEG, 2006). 
 
                                                 
3 Cassimon et al. (2008:1192) mention increased domestic borrowing that crowds out the private sector, 
irresponsible inflationary financing and unproportionate taxation of the productive economic sectors.  
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What  we  argue  here  is  that,  even  if  countries  supposedly  suffer  from  debt 
overhang,  the  indirect  effects  of  debt  swaps  on  the  macro-economic  performance  or  debt 
sustainability of these countries will be negligible, due to the ‘marginal’ nature of such swaps. 
This is clearly observable in our Indonesian and El Salvadorian case studies. In 2003, at the 
time of the first German-Indonesian debt-for-education swap, total outstanding external debt 
amounted to $ 135 billion in nominal value for Indonesia, equal to 58% of GDP or 196% of 
exports in 2003 (IMF, 2007). Therefore, the effect on debt overhang or debt sustainability of a € 
25.6 million and a € 23 million debt swap has been totally insignificant. According to its most 
recently published Debt Sustainability Analysis (IMF, 2007), Indonesia has moreover noticeably 
strengthened its debt sustainability position over time, both in terms of external debt and total 
public  debt.  Nowadays,  Indonesia’s  domestic  public  debt  poses  the  biggest  threat  to  debt 
sustainability (World Bank, 2007a). Analogously, the $ 10 million Spanish-El Salvadorian debt 
swap was nothing but a drop in the ocean, taking into account an external debt burden of $ 7 
billion, equal to 53% of GDP or 208% of exports, for El Salvador in 2005 (IMF, 2008; World 
Bank,  2007b).  El  Salvador’s  debt  sustainability  (of  its  external  and  public  debt)  has  also 
improved over the years (IMF, 2008).   
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II.   EDUCATION SECTOR SUPPORT 
 
Hitherto,  we  have  attempted  to  assess  the  potential  direct  and  indirect  macro-
economic effects of debt(-for-education) swaps. We now shift our focus to the concept of ‘donor 
earmarking’  and  the  modalities  of  the  education  sector  support  resulting  from  the  German-
Indonesian and Spanish-El Salvadorian swap operations in particular. 
 
  Donor earmarking 
 
To the extent that debt relief frees up additional resources in the recipient country’s 
budget, it is similar to general budget support that can be spent according to that country’s 
preferences. Donors have often resisted giving such great freedom of manoeuvre to developing 
country  governments.  They  have  wanted  to  ‘…either  directly  control  the  utilisation  of  these 
funds, or, more subtly, try to influence the behaviour of the recipient government through policy 
dialogue  and  conditionalities’  (Cassimon  et  al.,  2008:1193).  The  first  strategy  is  denoted  as 
‘earmarking’ in donor jargon. Such earmarking has taken on different forms over time, reflecting 
changing trends in donor thinking.
4  
 
Debt swaps are generally seen as instruments of ‘micro-earmarking’, referring to 
the donor’s desire to control the use of freed-up resources down to the smallest detail. Typically, 
those resources are deposited into jointly-managed counterpart funds
5, often outside regular 
government budgets, using donor -imposed implementation and monitoring mechanisms that 
bypass  the  g overnment’s  system  of  public  finance  management,  procurement  rules, 
implementation  procedures,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation.  Such  practice  used  to  be  very 
common and was part of the old project aid paradigm. Besides its apparent inherent strengths, 
such  as  high  donor  commitment,  strict  financial  control,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation 
according to donor accountability standards, this approach also has a number of well-known 
drawbacks, such as the futility of donor micro-control because of fungibility, high transaction 
costs,  lack  of  long-term  capacity  building  and  strengthening  of  the  public  management  and 
monitoring  and  evaluation  system,  and  weak  ownership  and  sustainability  (Cassimon  et  al., 
2008).  
 
Nowadays, the second strategy of donor control is favoured, leaving the allocation 
of  funds,  the  subsequent  planning,  budgeting  and  implementation  of  projects  and  the 
accompanying monitoring and evaluation processes in the hands of the recipient government, 
but at the same time trying to exert pressure to progressively improve the functioning of the 
public sector itself. The 2005 DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is exemplary of this 
evolution in donor strategy. In Paris, multilateral and bilateral donors subscribed to the concepts 
of  ‘policy  alignment’,  committing  themselves  to  base  their  overall  support  on  developing 
countries’  national  development  strategies,  and  ‘system  alignment’,  using  a  country’s  own 
institutions and systems for implementation, monitoring and evaluation where such institutions 
and systems are deemed reliable, effective and accountable (DAC, 2005 and 2007). Against 
this  backdrop,  debt  relief  practice  has  shifted  from  stringent  and  largely  donor-driven 
earmarking towards linking debt relief to broad recipient country-owned priority setting, through 
                                                 
4 This does not exclusively apply to debt relief but to other aid modalities as well. 
5 See Roemer (1989) for a comprehensive analysis of the counterpart fund mechanism.  
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the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
6 process in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief (MDRI) Initiative. As such, most debt relief has evolved to a 
kind of ‘debt-to-PRSP’ swap (Cassimon & Vaessen, 2007:24).  
 
Now one could wonder whether the debt-for-education swap initiatives reviewed 
here (between Germany and Indonesia on the one hand and Spain and El Salvador on the 
other), going against the current and returning to the old habit of micro-earmarking as they do, 
constitute  a  step  backwards.  Is  the  education  sector  support  resulting  from  these  swaps 
oblivious of the policy and system alignment commitments set out in the Paris Declaration or 
does it fit well with those principles? The remainder of this section seeks to address this crucial 
question, assessing whether the created education sector support in Indonesia and El Salvador 
could be understood as complementary to the existing PRSP-, MDG- and EFA-framework and 
to  what  extent  it  was  making  use  of  local  institutions  and  systems  for  implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation in place. 
 
  Policy alignment 
 
The  Interim-PRSP  of  Indonesia,  published  in  March  2003  by  the  Indonesian 
Committee  for  Poverty  Allevation  as  a  provisional  document  in  anticipation  of  a  full  PRSP, 
declares  education  to  be  a  top  priority  sector  (Government  of  Indonesia,  2003a).  The  first 
Indonesia MDG Progress Report gives an overview of Indonesia’s progress towards the goals 
over  the  period  1990  to  2003  and  looked  at  the  challenges  ahead  at  the  time  of  the  first 
German-Indonesian debt-for-education swap (UNDP, 2004). The report mentions Indonesia’s 
achievement of high primary enrolment rates (above 90% in most provinces) and almost perfect 
gender parity at the primary and junior secondary level. The overall access to junior secondary 
education  and  the  basic  education  graduation  rates  had  moreover  improved,  but  still  fell 
considerably  short  of  the  objectives  set  forth  in  Indonesia’s  Nine-Year  Compulsory  Basic 
Education  Programme.  Based  on  these  observations,  a  more  recent  World  Bank  study, 
reviewing Indonesia’s public expenditures, calls for ‘a higher share of resources to be allocated 
to improving enrollment rates of junior secondary schools, improving the quality of instruction 
throughout  the  education  system  and  rehabilitating  existing  education  infrastructure’  (World 
Bank, 2007a:28). In its formulation of an EFA strategy for 2003-2015, the Indonesian National 
Plan of Action acknowledges the need to improve the access to junior high schools and the 
quality  of basic education (Government of Indonesia, 2003b). It seems fair to state that the 
construction  and  equipment  of  511  learning  resource  centres  for  advanced  teacher  training 
(financed  by the first debt swap) and the construction of 100 new junior secondary schools in 
the remote and backward Eastern provinces (financed by the second debt swap) contribute to 
the  education  sector  goals  prioritised  by  the  Indonesian  government.  We  thus  agree  with 
Berensmann (2007) that the two first German-Indonesian debt-for-education swaps were very 
well integrated  within Indonesia’s national development strategies, displaying a considerable 
degree of policy alignment and country-ownership. 
 
How about the 2005 Spanish-El Salvadorian debt-for-education swap? First of all, 
it is important to note that El Salvador does not have a PRSP or similar overarching national 
                                                 
6 Such a PRSP is prepared by several development country stakeholders in a participatory way. It sets out 
a country’s macro-economic, structural and social policies and serves as the main policy document on 
which the government bases its budgetary expenditures for economic growth and poverty reduction.  
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development strategy document, nor has the country produced an EFA National Plan of Action, 
in spite of having signed the Jomtien and Dakar declarations. However, a Plan de Educación 
2021, a national education plan with a long-term vision does exist
7 (Romero, 2006; CME, 2006; 
Government of El Salvador, 2005). According to UNDP (2005), looking into the El Salvadorian 
progress towards the MDGs on a national and municipal level, there was a significant increase 
in the overall primary enrollment rate, basic education graduation rate and literacy rate for youth 
aged between 15 and 24 during the period 1991 -2004. Nevertheless, some major regional 
differences persisted; Almost one third of the El Salvadorian municipalities are lagging behind 
and will need to step up efforts if they are to attain MDG 2 (UNDP, 2005). It were arguably these 
geographical discrepancies that the Spanish-El Salvadorian debt-for-education swap was trying 
to reduce by financing the construction and rennovation of educational infrastructure and the 
distribution of didactic material in the 100 poorest muncipalities of El Salvador (Romero, 2006; 
Vera, 2007). The debt swap counterpart  funds were used to support two of eleven strategical 
programs of the Plan de Educación 2021. As in the case of Indonesia, there appears to be a 
great  level  of  policy  alignment.  It  should  however  be  noted  that,  in  this  regard,  the  El 
Salvadorian case is rather atypical when compared to other debt swaps executed by Spain
8 
where the alignment of swap practices with the development strategies of the debtor country 
has often been far less clear (CME, 2006). 
 
  System alignment 
 
The  German-Indonesian  debt-for-education  swaps  were  executed  within  the 
framework  of  the  Science  Education  Quality  Improvement  Project  (SEQIP),  a  bilateral 
partnership established in 1994 between the German government and the Indonesian Ministry 
of National Education (MONE) (Allramseder & Schmalhofer, 2004). After an initial two-year test 
phase, the German Technical Cooperation Agency GTZ was entrusted with the development of 
the SEQIP concept and the provision of technical assistance, while the financial side of the 
project has been in hands of the German Development Bank KfW since 1999. Consequently, 
KfW was appointed by the German government as a watchdog for the first debt-for-education 
swap,  charged  with  the  task  of  appraising  the  Indonesian  proposal  and  monitoring  the 
budgeting and implementation process. Ultimately, the MONE itself was solely responsible for 
the implementation of its approved proposal and all the costs involved (KfW Office Jakarta, 
2008). It developed the contents and curricula of the 511 Learning Resource Centres (LRCs) 
that were built and provided guidelines for the construction of the centres and the distribution of 
material, for which responsibility was delegated to the District Education Boards and which were 
executed by local contractors, parents and local residents. The actual management of the LRCs 
was  entrusted  to  committees  composed  of  the  school  board,  teachers,  parents  and  other 
members of the local community (Allramseder & Schmalhofer, 2004). Debt relief under the first 
debt swap was granted at the completion point of the project and after an independent audit firm 
had  provided  an  audit  report  confirming  the  project’s  proper  implementation  (KfW  Office 
Jakarta, 2008). Overall, it seems positive that the earlier established SEQIP format was adopted 
for  the  debt  swap  arrangement,  instead  of  creating  another  so-called  ‘Parallel  Project 
Implementation Unit’ (DAC, 2005) or PIU, and that the implementation of the project was left to 
                                                 
7 The Plan de Educacíón 2021 sets policies and objectives with the year 2021, representing the 200
th 
birthday of El Salvador’s independence, as the ultimate target date (Government of El Salvador, 2005). 
8 CME (2006) mentions Spanish debt swaps with Honduras and Nicaragua.  
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the Indonesian MONE. System alignment with respect to the monitoring and ex-post evaluation 
of the project was however clearly lacking. 
 
With regard to the Spanish-El Salvadorian debt-for education swap, it can be seen 
that the distribution of responsibilities was similar to that of other Spanish debt swap initiatives. 
A  Binational  Committee  of  Spanish  and  El  Salvadorian  delegates  was  created  as  the  main 
coordination body for the debt swap. The selection, presentation, technical support and ex post 
evaluation of projects financed with the fund were assigned to a Technical Committee in which, 
among others, the Spanish Technical Cooperation Agency OTC, the El Salvadorian Ministery of 
Economy  (MINEC)  and  Education  (MINED)  and  the  Spanish  NGO  Fe  y  Alegría  were 
represented. There was however no room for any form of representation of the El Salvadorian 
civil society (CME, 2006; Vera, 2007). The debt-for-education swap with El Salvador introduced 
a  small  but  important  innovation  in  comparison  with  previous  Spanish  swap  deals;  The 
Binational  Committee  could,  albeit  in  exceptional  cases,  put  out  an  open  tender  for  the 
implementation of projects, whereas before only Spanish or debtor country NGOs with sufficient 
Spanish  capital  were  eligible  (CME,  2006;  Vera,  2007).  Eventually,  as  formally  agreed,  the 
Binational Committee always had the last word in the approval of project proposals. The actual 
organisation  and  maintenance  of  the  constructed  facilities  is  the  main  responsibility  of  local 
district  education  councils  (Romero,  2006).  The  foregoing  seems  to  point  at  substantial 
participation  of  debtor  country  El  Salvador  and  use  of  its  own  government  structures  and 
institutions at all project stages (no PIU), which is also recognised by Vera (2007). 
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III.  CONCLUSION: DEBT SWAPS AND THE NEW AID PARADIGM 
 
Debt-for-development swaps gained some prominence from the end of the 1980s 
onwards,  when  the  Paris  Club  gave  the  green  light  for  debtor  countries  to  engage  in  such 
swaps
9.  Advocates  of  these  swaps  have  hailed  them  as  inventive  mechanisms  that  are 
attractive and advantageous to all parties involved. In practice, debt swaps did however not fully 
deliver on their promises of increasing net financial transfers to poor countries, reducing their 
indebtedness and channelling freed -up resources to development projects along the debtor 
country’s priorities. Critiques concerning limited additionality, insufficient scale and inappropriate 
conditionality clauses have triggered theoretical thinking on debt to evolve in favour of larger-
scale and more comprehensive debt relief initiatives, with tailored conditionalities, such as the 
HIPC Initiative and the MDRI. 
 
Nevertheless, traditional debt-for-development swap proposals have resurfaced in 
recent  years  in  the  education  sector  and  elsewhere,  seemingly  ignoring  criticism  of  earlier 
experiments. They include multi-donor constructions such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) that is promoting debt-for-health swaps (Cassimon et al., 
2008). Other prominent believers are UNAIDS, which is pleading for debt-for-AIDS swaps (De 
Vylder, 2004) and ILO, making a case for debt-for-microfinance swaps (ILO, 2001). UNESCO is 
now equally eager to promote debt-for-education swaps, drawing on experiences of bilateral 
donors,  most  notably  Spain  and  Germany,  with  such  arrangements  (UNESCO,  2007a  and 
2007b). The arguments used nowadays to defend such practices are almost identical to those 
touted 20 years ago. While supporters of these new swap schemes do acknowledge the need 
to learn from past failures, they stress that these new initiatives relate to countries and/or debt 
titles that fall outside current international debt relief initiatives such as the HIPC initiative, and 
are  to  be  understood  as  complementary  rather  than  competitive.  Indeed,  the  new  schemes 
typically target  lower-middle income countries (such as Indonesia and El Salvador), or non-
HIPC  low  income  countries  (such  as  Pakistan),  non-eligible  debt  (such  as  remaining  post-
HIPC/MDRI multilateral debt), or recalcitrant creditors within existing debt relief initiatives. 
In  reviewing  the  debt-for-education  swap  initiatives  between  Germany  and 
Indonesia on the one hand and Spain and El Salvador on the other, this paper has shown that 
with respect to sector support modalities a lot of progress has been made. In both case studies, 
earlier criticisms of inappropriate micro-control and weak ownership seem to have been taken 
into account, as donor commitment to the Paris Declaration’s principles of policy and system 
alignment appears to be reasonably well respected. This can however not compensate for the 
deficient macro-economic nature of these debt swap constructions. The impact on fiscal space 
has been much more limited than presented in the case of Indonesia and even negative for El 
Salvador. Furthermore, and mainly because of the existing DAC accounting rules for ODA, it is 
very unlikely that the debt-for-education swaps considered involved funds that were additional 
to other aid interventions. Indirect macro-economic effects, such as the mitigation of defensive 
lending or debt overhang (under the assumption that such a phenomenon corresponds with the 
actual situation in Indonesia and El Salvador), have said to been negligible, due to the marginal 
nature  of  the  swaps  in  comparison  with  overall  debt  stocks.  The  argument  that  these  new 
swaps could target countries or debt titles that fall outside current debt relief initiatives is not 
                                                 
9Both Kaiser & Lambert (1996) and Moye (2001) provide an detailed overview of these first-generation 
debt swaps.  
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really  relevant,  as  it  is  essentially  the  nature  of  the  operation,  based  on  dubious  macro-
economic assumptions, that is problematic (Cassimon et al., 2008).  
 
In  the  end,  it  looks  as  if  the  debt-for-education  concept  is  not  an  appropriate 
answer to the EFA financing gap which UNESCO is trying to address. Especially now voices 
are being raised to establish a Global Education Fund, a reformed and improved version of the 
EFA-FTI  architecture  in  place  which  would  be  at  least  partially  modelled  on  the  GFATM 
(Sperling, 2009; Bermingham, 2009), a real possibility exists that sooner or later a new debt 
conversion  programme  for  education  will  be  put  forward,  in  analogy  to  the  GFATM’s 
Debt2Health Initiative (Cassimon et al., 2008). We argue that this would not constitute a way 
forward. For debt relief to hold at least some promise of translating into an efficient and effective 
instrument of development, it should be large and comprehensive, as in the case of the HIPC 
Initiative and its successor the MDRI. An extension of the latter initiatives, relaxing their strict 
eligibility rules so as to include more countries and debt titles, demands concerted efforts but 
would arguably make more sense than promoting debt swaps that fragment the aid business 
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